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FOREIGN TRADE CONTRACTS BETWEEN
WEST GERMAN COMPANIES AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
A CASE-STUDY 1
RoBERT HEUSER 2

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, businessmen in the West have had high expectations for developing the
market potential of China. Those hopes have never been realized
- neither in the colonial nineteenth century nor in the years
preceding or following the Communist accession to power.
Explanations for that failure have varied, but the hopes of
"selling 'oil for the lamps of China' [are] no less intoxicating
today than they were in 1937," 3 when U.S. businessman Carl
Crowe first published his book, 400 Million Customers. After the
eleventh edition, Crowe succeeded in proving only that the United
States remains an excellent market for literature promising a
utopian future; the China-market remained illusory.
The years since 1972 have brought substantial changes in the
Chinese approach to foreign trade. 4 The polarity between the
precept of self-reliance and the economic concept of participation
1. This is a revised version of my German written paper "Die Vertragspraxis
im Handel zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik
China," in Recht der Intemationalen Wirtschaft (Heidelberg), vol. 22 (1976), pp.
609-619.
2. Reserch fellow at the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law at Heidelberg; member of the Bar of Karlsruhe, affiliated to
the law firm of Dr. Wellbrock and colleagues, Heidelberg.
Abbreviations: AJIL = American Journal of International Law; AHD =
Aubenhandelsdienst (of the German Chambers of Commerce); RIW = Recht der
Internationalen Wirtschaft (Heidelberg); Ch.a. =China aktuell (Hamburg); BGBl =
Bundesgesetzblatt; FGHB = Fagui-Huibian (Collection of laws of the PRC);
Hamburger Vertragssammlung_ = Institut fur Asienkunde (ed.), Die Vertrage der
VR China mit anderen Staaten; NZZ = Neue Zurcher Zeitung; P.R. = Peking
Rundschau/Peking Review; USCBR = US-China Business Review (Washington,
D. C.).
3. E. Neiland, Ch. Smith, The Future of the China Market, Stanford 1974, p.
10.
4. For general information about the development of China's foreign trade,
see, e.g., G. Etienne, China's Industrialization and Foreign Trade, Asia Quarterly
(Brussels), 1974, at 105 ff.; A. Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and
Foreign Trade, New York 1966; Feng-Hwa Mah, The Foreign Trade of Mainland
China, Chicago etc. 1971; B. Kunze, Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen der VR
China und den westlichen Industriestaaten, Hamburg 1972.
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in the international division of labor was reduced in the Chinese
communist ideology. In foreign trade, as in other spheres of
Chinese policy, the principal concern is to find adequate methods,
within the Chinese ideological framework, for modernizing a
technologically underdeveloped China. During China's first ten
years under Mao Tse-tung, the response to this concern consisted
of a continuation of the pre-communist approach, with the parties
appropriately changed. Thus "yi-bian-dao," "to lean on one side,"
indicated cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Peoples'
Democracies rather than, as before, with the western capitalist
countries. Mao was explicit: "Of course, we want to have trade" but not with the foreign reactionaries, the imperialists, who do not
care about the principles of "equality" and "mutual benefit." 5
Mao's leaning on one side, however, was ill-repaid: the Soviet
Union, as its capitalist predecessors in trade, "ripped up the
contracts."6 Never before had a Chinese government felt so
despised. Mter all, "the allia.nce with Soviet Russia [was] the first
deliberately chosen alliance in Chinese history." 7 Following this
treatment, China turned inward. It was felt that Chinese national
pride could only be regained and developed through "confidence
in one's own resources." It was some time before Chinese foreign
trade took on substantial dimensions. This hiatus in trade is
mirrored in the publication history of the Chinese periodical
Foreign Trade. First published in 1956, the journal published an
article in its November 1966 issue entitled, "The Great Victory of
the Principle of Self-Reliance." With this issue, Foreign Trade
stopped publication until1974. China, the "pupil of the West" and
"small brother of the Soviet Union," began its program of
modernization. It can hardly be disputed, for example, that China
made an important contribution to the theory and practice of
development among the countries of the Third World. 8
Even under Mao, however, efforts of the collective will and the
mobilization of the masses have not been able to bring about the
massive industrialization program presented by Chou En-lai at
the fourth National Peoples' Congress in January 1975. 9 The
5. On Democratic Dictatorship of the People (June 1949), Selected Works, vol.
IV, Peking 1969 (German edition at 443).
6. An often used expression in Chinese publications.
7. C. P. FitzGerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, Oxford
1964, at 56.
8. See, e.g., H. Schweitzer, Sozialistische Agrartheorie und Praxis, Bern 1972.
9. See Documents of the first session of the IVth National People's Congress
of the PRC, Peking 1975 (German edition at 59 f.).
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decision of the Chinese government to accept larger and longertermed credits than had been accepted at any time since the
Cultural Revolution can be regarded as the most important
expression of a new orientation in the sphere of foreign trade. 10
This measure weakened one of the basic tenets of the precept of
"self-reliance," and was necessitated by the growth of China's
transactions with Japanese, U.S. and West European firms.
Nevertheless, the forms of these transactions - primarily
licensing, planning, supply and installation of complete plants,
particularly in the fields of chemicals and steel - indicates that
China has not altogether foresworn self-reliance: China has
continued to seek those sorts of transactions over which she can
maintain the greatest control and which she can use to enhance
"confidence in one's own resources." These transactions with
capitalist companies have increased steadily since 1972. In 1971,
China's foreign trade amounted to U.S. $4.5 billion; in just two
years, by 1973, China's trade volume had more than doubled, to
U.S. $9.9 billion. 11 Of that trade, Japan takes the largest part,
followed by the states of the EEC. Among the latter, the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) has the largest part, U.S. $599 million
(1974 figures). France follows with U.S. $366 million, then Great
Britain with U.S. $339 million and Italy with U.S. $222 million
(1974 figures). According to the opinion of the Ministry for
Economic Mfairs of the FRG, the trade exchange between China
and the FRG might double or even triple by 1980. 12
This expansion of foreign trade with the PRC has necessitated an increasing scrutiny of the Chinese legal system. For
example, a delegation of the National Council for U.S.-China
Trade issued a "Peking Report" in which it was said that "[b]oth
sides acknowledge an awareness of the importance of certain legal
issues in the general facilitation of trade. These relate to matters
of copyright, trademark, patent protection, dispute settlement
procedure, varying contract forms and clauses, insurance, trade
documentation, [and] contractual arrangements for major tran10. Such a decision is mentioned by A. Donnithome in "China's Foreign Trade
System Changes Gear," USCBR, vol. 1, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 1974), at 16. For recent
trends, see Current Scene Sept. 1976 (China's Foreign Trade in 1975).
11. This is in accordance with a world-wide trend, partly characterized by
inflation. The structural marginal role of the Chinese foreign trade should not be
forgotten_ China's foreign trade represented never more than 5% of her GNP, and
the share of this country in world-trade is less than 1%.
12. See "Die Welt" (Bonn), No. 263, of 11.11.1975, at 10.
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sactions. . ."1 3 The Chinese have been reluctant to create a
formalized domestic legal system. They did, however, establish
within the China Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade a
legal department which may be consulted by foreign trade
companies. That there is an interest in the legal aspects of foreign
trade is also evidenced by the Primer on International Trade that
was prepared by the foreign trade department of the Liaoning
Finance Institute.l4

Table 1
Exports
to China

Japan
Hong kong
USA (1972)
EEC
FRG
Japan
Hongkong
USA
EEC
FRG

Imports
from China

1971 (Million U.S. $)
577.1
332.1
10.3
549.6
63.5
33
175
140
1974 (Million U.S. $)
1987
1305
20
1123
64
690
838
959
409
190

Total

899.7
559.6
96.15
315
3292
1143
754
1797
599

The present paper illustrates the Chinese approach to some of
the above mentioned legal issues using the experiences of West
German participants in the China trade. Before proceeding to an
analysis of actual contract terms, it will be instructive to outline
the state-to-state relationship of the two countries in regard to
international trade.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FRG-PRC TRADE

In the period following World War II, trade between the FRG
and the PRC was impeded by obstacles arising from trade policies
and from politics in generaJ.l 5 The FRG consented to the embargo
13. Special Report No. 6, Washington D.C., Dec. 1973, at 5; more explicitly
developed by Walter Sterling Surrey, ibid., pp. 40-43, see also pp. 68-75.
14. Guoji-maoyi-zhishi, Peking 1973; English: Primer on International Trade,
in: Chinese Economic Studies (iasp-series), vol. VIII, no. 2 (winter 1974175).
15. For this section see B. Grossmann, "Die Entwicklung der deutschchinesischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," in: Die Aussenpolitik Chinas, Miinchen
and Wien 1975, pp. 381-396.
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imposed by the United Nations, under pressure of the United
States, during the Korean War; the FRG applied the embargo to
deliveries for which China had already paid. Another obstacle
was the 1953 "Special List-China," which precluded exportation of
the very goods that, in fact or potentially, made up the main part
of German-Chinese trade, for example, steel products, machinery
and optical instruments. In the mid-1950s, however, a relaxation
developed gradually, until on September 27, 1957, a trade
agreement was executed between the Eastern Committee of the
Association of the German Economy and the China Committee
for the Promotion of International Trade. 16 In 1958 the mutual
trade between the two countries amounted to DM927.5 million
(681.9 million German exports). The agreement was concluded for
only one year and was not renewed. The Chinese side, however,
was now eager to negotiate on a governmental level.
Governmental-level negotiations became possible only after
diplomatic relations were established on October 11, 1972.17 Eight
months later the first trade agreement on a governmental level
was signed. 1s Because the competence of the EEC countries to
conclude treaties was transferred to the European Community (on
January 1, 1975) this agreement could only have a short term. The
relationship between the two countries, however, had developed
very satisfactorily during this short time, and it is expected that
the regulations of the 1973 agreement will serve as basis for the
deepening of the mutual trade in the future. Regarding the legal
aspects of foreign trade the following provisions of the agreement
may be emphasized: the mutual allowance of the most favored
nation treatment (art. 2), carrying out the transfers in German
Mark and Renmin-bi or another freely convertible currency agreed
upon (art. 4), and the establishment of a "Mixed Commission" for
the promotion of mutual trade (art. 5). 1 9 During the two years after
normalization, the trade between the two countries had nearly
doubled compared with the year before normalization. The
16. Published as "Runderlass Aussenwirtschaft no. 61157," in: Bundesan·
zeiger, Koln, no. 207 of Oct. 26, 1957. Reprinted in Hamburger Vertragssammlung,
part 3, Frankfurt etc. 1965, at 4.
17. By a joint communique; Chinese and German text in: Ch.a. October 1972,
at 48.
18. BGBI. II, at 974.
19. A corresponding agreement was signed when Federal-Chancellor H.
Schmidt visited Peking during Oct. 1975. Notification of Dec. 12, 1975, BGBI. II, at
2239.
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Chinese exhibition in June 1975 in Cologne 20 and the German
exhibition in September of the same year in Peking21 had in fact
deepened the insight into the capacities of the supply and need of
the partner cmmtry. According to the desire of the Chinese, mme
than 150 symposia and lectures were scheduled to present modern
German technology. This makes it clear once again that the
Chinese have a strong will to learn as much as possible from other
countries.
After extensive negotiations, an exchange of notes concerning
the mutual registration of trademarks took place at August 8,
1975.2 2 Finally, shipping and air-traffic agreements were concluded in October 1975. 23
III. THE FOREIGN TRADE CONTRACT

In contrast to the institutional framework in which China's
foreign trade is executed, 24 the concrete features of trade relations
with partners in capitalistic states are rather poorly known. This
is not surprising. On the one hand, the bilateral trade agreements
with capitalist states are usually very cursory, 25 while on the other
20. See Yu-Hsi Nieh, Chinesische Nationalausstellung in Koln, Ch.a. July
1975, at 373.
21. See H. Dohmen, Technogerma - ins Ungewisse gesat, in Ch.a. Oct. 1975,
at 630. The catalogue of the German exhibition in Peking names more than 300
exhibitors of complicated machinery.
22.' BGBI. I, at 2561.
23. Not yet published. The shipping agreement is based on the principle of
nondiscrimination of ships and contains provisions concerning exemption of
double-taxation.
24. This topic had been dealt with on several occasions; see: Foreign Trade
Organizations, P.R. Sept. 9, 1958; G.T. Hsiao, Communist China's Foreign Trade
Organization, in: Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 20 (1966/67), at 303; V. Li, Legal
Aspects of Trade with Communist China, in: Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law, vol. 3 (1964), at 57; G. Crespi Reghizzi, Legal Aspects of Trade with China:
The Italian Experience, in: Harvard Law Journal, vol. 9 (1968), at 85; 0. Weggel,
Das Aussenhandelsrecht der Volksrepublik China (The Law of International
Trade of the PRC), Baden-Baden 1976, at 161.
25. See, e.g., G.T. Hsiao, Communist China's Trade Treaties and Agreements
(1949-1964), in: Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 21 (1967/68), at 623. Contrary to the
contracts with private companies, the contracts between state-trading countries
are based on extensive agreements called "General Conditions of Delivery," which
can be regarded as codifications of the relevant contract law of foreign trade. See,
e.g., "Allgemeine Lieferbedingungen zwischen den Aussenhandelsorganisationen
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und den Assenhandelsorganisationen der
Volksrepublik China fiir das Jahr 1966," in: Ministerium fiir Aussenwirtschaft
(ed.), Aussenhandel. Eine Sammlung der wichtigsten internationalen Vereinbarungen und Handelsbedingungen, Berlin 1968, at 277.
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hand, the contracts concluded with western companies have been
analyzed only in some individual cases 26 and have almost never
been published. 27 However, it is in the contract that the exchange
of goods finds its legal expression.
In a textbook concerning legal and economic aspects of
foreign trade, 2 a the foreign trade contract (ftc) is defined in
general terms:
Commercial contracts are negotiated agreements signed in
order to determine the mutual rights and responsibilities of
both buyer and seller in an exchange of certain goods. Once
the contract is signed, the two sides agree to consider it a
commitment ~th all the actual force of a legal agreement.
After a reference to the general use of standard form contracts in
international trade, the Primer goes on:
The "London Contract" is one of these. This contract is
clearly of a class nature. For instance, the "London
Contract" includes clauses that call for the determination of
the quality and weight of goods on arrival and for London
arbitration based on English law as the final method of
settling any disputes . . . It is a tool of the British monopoly
capitalists use to plunder and exploit the developing nations
. . . When our nation signs a contract with a foreign exportimport company, it resolutely adheres to the Principle of
reciprocity based on equality and rejects any one-sided
clauses . . . In the process of carrying out a contract we
adhere from beginning to end to the principle of ''honoring
the contract and keeping one's word" and thus help the
development of our foreign trade relations.
How such general formulated principles of the ftc are
developed in the specific contact with West German trading
partners is shown in this paper, using fifteen contracts concluded
between German firms and Chinese foreign trade companies as a
26. Besides the analysis of the Italian experience, there is one regarding
Canada (S. Stark, An Analysis of the Foreign Trade Practices of the PRC
Including Comments on the Canadian Experience, in: University of British
Columbia Law Review, vol. 5, 1970, at 165), and regarding Great Britain (A. Smith,
Standard Form Contracts in the International Commercial Transactions of the
PRC, in: International and Comparative Law Qu., vol. 21, 1972, at 133).
27. Three contracts with Japanese companies are printed as an annex to G.T.
Hsiao, Communist China's Foreign Trade Contracts and Means of Settling
Disputes, in: Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 22 (1968/69), at 503.
28. See supra note 14 (subsequently referred to as "Primer").
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basis. 2 9 All but three of these transactions were agreed upon after
1971. They contain a considerable volume of supply. The so-called
traditional business, i.e., delivery of semifinished and finished
products, is increasingly supplemented by the sale of complete
plants. Furthermore, whereas the former have usually been
carried out through standard form contracts of the respective
foreign trade company, 30 the latter transactions are negotiated in
detail. It is clear that the legal problems are primarily involved in
this latter sphere.

a. Contract Negotiations
Contract negotiations concerning the sale of complete plants
usually follow after a bid of a Chinese foreign trade company
reaches a German firm. Thereupon, the German firm responds by
submitting an ample offer, consisting of a technical and a
commercial part, 31 whereafter the Chinese side extends an
invitation to the German firm. All negotiations are held in Peking,
so that the necessary check-backs of the Chinese delegates to their
superiors can be done quickly at their home capital.
Contract negotiations are divided into a technical and a
commercial-legal part. Only after the technical questions (documentation, method and technique, guarantees, etc.) have largely
been made clear do the commercial-legal negotiations begin. Both
parts of the negotiations are described by German business men
and technical personnel as "hard and difficult, but proceeding in
an agreeable atmosphere." The Chinese act as self-conscious
buyers, who are using their strong negotiating position; they are,
however, somewhat more flexible than their Soviet counterparts.
The extent of the flexibility of the Chinese negotiators undermines
the assertion that trading contracts with the PRC are, in fact,
merely "dictated contracts." 32 The composition of the Chinese
29. I am grateful to the German executives for their friendly cooperation
during my interviews with them.
30. Mostly during the Canton Fairs, but also by telegraph. Here contract
negotiations are more or less reduced to negotiations about prices. All the other
contract clauses are not debateable.
31. The firstly fixed commitment to the offer runs usually up to three months.
32. See 0. Weggel, op. cit., at 119. It is to be understood that such an
appreciation has to be seen in the light of respective conditions of competition and
the interest of the Chinese buyer for the products involved. Regarding the
"tributary" tendencies (so called according to the traditional Chinese concept of
international relations) in Chinese foreign trade behavior some observations may
be mentioned: The seller of bigger objects has to travel to Peking to negotiate
personnally; he has to adjust himself to the procedure of the Chinese (agenda,
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negotiating team is relatively constant. Both at the technical and
the commercial level, the negotiations take place under the
supervision of a leader; the commercial one appears to be superior.
The leader is introduced as such or as "speaker"; it also happens
on occasion that the leader's position only becomes apparent in
the course of the negotiations. This leadership position is often
occupied by a woman. The leader possesses both professional and
ideological competence. Sometimes, however, the ideological
element is incorporated in the person of a so-called "people's
engineer." According to a corporation having negotiations in
spring 1974 (at a time when the principle of "self-reliance" was
again stressed strongly), the long monologs of the leader of the
negotiating team were hampering the pace of the negotiations.
Delay was also caused by the fact that some members of the
Chinese team had to participate simultaneously in ideological
classes and could not regularly take part in the commercial
proceedings. Sometimes the ideological element cannot be identified with one particular team member but is only represented by
the usual polit-language which quite often articulates only
generally understood circumstances in its own peculiar way.
When, e.g., a German firm proposed to send a certain number of
its assemblers to the construction site, the Chinese remarked that
one would "mobilize the masses" and therefore would not need so
many German personnel. 33 It may also occur that German
negotiators are told that they do not know the Chinese people
sufficiently, otherwise they would not insist on the incorporation
of such and such a clause into the contract. The other members of
the Chinese team are - as far as the technical side is concerned always to be recognized as specialists. They come partly from the
negotiating foreign trade company (i.e., China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and China National Technical
Import Corporation), and partly from the eventual buyer and from
advisory institutes. In the commercial-legal sphere, an allocation
of functions is not always identifiable. Specialists for problems
change of topics, pace of the negotiations) and to stay so long as the Chinese
consider it adequate. A contract draft brought along is ignored by the Chinese. In
other socialist states the seller is expected to take the pains of working out such a
draft. It appears that the Chinese are not unwilling to accept small and practical
presents.
33. Here a problem is seen insofar as the Chinese handicap the German
contractor in his development dictated by technical considerations and needs, on
the other side; however, they are not prepared to take the risk of such interference.
In other words: the clauses concerning liability cannot be adapted to the "selfreliance"-pride which became incorporated into the contract.
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concerning banking or shipping are rarely recognizable. Furthermore, the Chinese negotiate without jurists, and this may lead to
misunderstandings. "Warranty," "limitation of liability," "patent
liability," etc. are discussed and regulated, but the German
partner frequently has the impression that the Chinese negotiators do not fully grasp the meaning and the relevance of these
legal institutions, and that they do not share the importance given
to these questions by German firms. 34
Although the structural composition of the Chinese negotiating team seems to remain constant, individual negotiators are
frequently exchanged. This necessitates verbal repetitions by the
German team and reflects, on the Chinese side, the desire to use
the opportunity to learn as much as possible concerning German
trading tactics and practices. During negotiations, the sole
function of several members of the Chinese team is to keep the
minutes of the negotiations as complete as possible. These records
serve as a kind of seismograph for the statements of the selling
side in order to be able to pin down the latter to their own words, if
this should be necessary.
The competence of the Chinese team to make decisions is
presumably very limited in the technical sphere as well as in the
field of commercial-legal negotiations. The Chinese negotiators
very often have to check with their superior authority even on
such matters as packaging. This permanently moving vertical
structure of the Chinese decision-making process is the main
reason for the relatively long negotiations that take place in
Peking. Direct contact by the German delegates with superior
offices is not at all possible. The president or vice-president of the
34. That they are not always informed about the legal structure of capitalistic
organized companies - they doubt, e.g., the legal personality of subsidiaries may be remarked in passing. On the other side the Chinese appear occasionally to
withhold legal knowledge. Up till now the most voluminous German-Chinese
transaction was offered by a consortium. The Chinese were not at all familiar with
this institution. After being informed accordingly at the beginning of the
negotiations they again asked at the conclusion of the negotiations (after months)
whether they really have to sign the contract together with the consortium instead
with the negotiating company. The next day they showed up with the following
contract clause which suggests their complete understanding of the legal
implications: "The representatives of the Seller - A and B - shall assume jointly
and/or individually full responsibilities for the Buyer in respect to the execution of
the contractual stipulations and the Seller's obligations. It shall be considered as
equally authentic to the Seller that either the Buyer gets in touch with any one of
the above mentioned Companies or both of them as a whole in regard to the
fulfillment of the Contract."
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relevant Chinese corporation appears only when the contract is
finally ready to be signed.
The conclusion of the contract in the case of extensive
bilateral negotiations creates no legal problems in China. The
contract comes into force either after the realization of a
condition 35 (ex nunc or ex tunc) or without any condition through
the signature only (for instance, " ... shall come into force with
its signature by both parties").

b. Conditions of Payment, Documents and Shipping
It is nearly proverbial that the Chinese generally pay in cash.
This does not mean that there are no negotiations about long-term
payment. In such a case the Chinese make it clear that they are
not willing to accept the current rate of interest common in
Germany; they are only prepared to consider 6 to 6.5% (fixed)
interest. In one specific case both sides had already agreed to
include in the price of the contract plant the difference between
the actual German rate of interest (which, as the Chinese are
aware, the German supplier has to take into account) and the rate
officially accepted by the Chinese. The long-term loan arrangement finally failed because the parties could not agree upon the
modalities of its execution. Instead, however, the Chinese offered
cash payment. In such case payment 36 is done in successive
steps: installment, delivery rate, fulfillment of the guarantee of
process, and fulfillment of the mechanical guarantee. Possible
repayable advance payments are secured by a bank guarantee.
Security of the contract price is obtained by a guarantee of the
Bank of China.
Recently it has become possible again to agree upon a socalled "deferred payment" 37 with a term generally of five years
35. For instance: Presentation of the export certificate of the government. The
realization of the condition(s) is communicated by telegram. The date of the last
dispatched telegram is regarded.as the moment on which the contract comes into
force. This date must then be mutually confirmed.
36. Always in German Mark. Exports from China are since 1972 always in
Renmin-Bi. For the Chinese currency see USCBR vol. 1, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1974), at
50 and ibid., no. 3 (May-June 1974), at 33. Shortly after the Cultural Revolution the
Chinese also insisted on a Renmin-Bi base in regard to import-contracts; see AHD
1970, at 421, 611.
37. Before 1967 it was usually and plainly called a "loan agreement." At that
time as well as now a first installment, delivery rate and the guarantee rates are
followed by half-year installments. After delivery is executed to a certain degree
the supplier presents a certain number of drafts which the customer mm,t accept
and will present with the respective installment.
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following the date on which the contract plant has begun to
function. Payment is always made by irrevocable letters of credit
after the documents have been checked. 38 Thus far the Chinese
have not accepted that a trustee-bank abroad may check the
documents after which payment may occur.
For a contract to enter into force, it is necessary that the seller
present an exporting license or a certificate expressing that such a
license is not needed. Regarding shipping documents the Chinese
request the following: one full set Clean On Board Ocean Bills of
Lading marked "Freight to Collect" and made out to order, blank
endorsed; several copies of invoice, indicating contract number
and shipping marks; two copies of a packing list with the
indication of shipping weight; two copies of a certificate of quality
and quantity issued by the manufacturers; a certified copy of a
cable to the Buyers advising shipment immediately after the
shipment has been made; a full set of technical documentation.
The reference to "Incoterms 1953" in the contract is objected
to by the Chinese with the explanation that China is not a party
to this agreement. However, the Chinese do accept relevant
definitions such as f.o.b. and c.i.f. Exports to China are always
f.o.b. German port package included. 39 The ship is provided for by
the buyer,40 who also concludes insurance through the Chinese
People'~ Insurance Company. 41 Recently the Chinese have also
38. The Chinese formula: "After having received the following documents and
found them in order ... " was considered by the German partner as too subjective
and replaced by "having checked the conformity . . . . "The L/C is opened by the
Bank of China in Peking (also Shanghai, Canton) shortly before the date of
shipment. It is payable in China, always irrevocable, but unconfirmed; the German
bank communicating the documents takes no guarantees. The first installment or
payment in general occurs usually within four weeks after shipping, thus before
arrival of the goods which needs six to eight weeks.
39. For instance: "The prices are for delivering f.o.b. north sea port including
packing, not stowing." In the standard contract of the China National Machinery
Import and Export Corporation "f.o.b." as such is not mentioned. The contract's
"terms of shipment," however, contain the incoterms-definition and in addition an
extension of the buyer's risk regarding the functioning of the tackle (" ... and is
released from the tackle"). For the Shanghai Branch of the same foreign trade
company it suffices that " . . . the goods have effectively passed the ship's rails."
40. For the principal sources of ships used for the Chinese maritime transport,
see "Primer," at 27.
41. For maritime transport insurance, see "Primer" at 28. The effective
"Maritime Transport Goods Insurance Clause" contains three types of insurance:
"total damage insurance, basic insurance, ani multipurpose insurance." This new
clause "not only adheres to the principle of independence, equality, and mutual
benefit, but embodies the spirit of our nation's opposition to the imperialist policies
of aggression and war." In the "new war damage clause" it is made clear that "if
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insisted on "f.o.b. and stowing," which has long been a common
feature in trade with other state trading countries.

c. Inspection, Tax and Duties
In contrast to the traditional trade regarding delivery of
individual goods, the Chinese Import Commodity Inspection
Office42 is not involved in the trade concerning the sale of
complete plants. An inspection of the machines and equipment
determined for shipment to China is sometimes undertaken in the
seller's factory by a Chinese delegation. A transfer of risk is not
associated with such an inspection. After arrival in China the
materials are immediately brought to the construction site and
checked by the Chinese in the presence of a representative of the
seller. There is nothing like an inspection fee.
Concerning possible resulting tax and duty payments the
following regulation is common in the contracts:
All taxes and/or duties of any kind whatsoever in connection
with the performance of the Contract imposed by the
authorities of the Buyer's country shall be borne by the
Buyer, and all taxes and/or duties of any kind whatsoever in
connection with the performance of the Contract imposed by
the authorities of the Seller's country shall be borne by the
Seller.

d.

Force Majeur and Penalties

Different clauses concerning force majeur are to be found in
the contracts. This notion always includes "natural disasters,"
such as typhoon, fire, flood, heavy snow, and earthquake.
Sometimes the following formulation is also added: "including
other cases recognized as force majeure, and which cannot be
controlled by both parties .... " Sometimes "war" and "civil war"
are also included. The broader formula (which was already used in
China's trade with western countries), "including reasons beyond
the control of either Party and reasons unforeseen, which may
occur during the process of manufacturing or in the course of
testing and shipment . . .," could not be written in the contracts
the insured goods are used by imperialists to carry out wars of aggression, at the
outbreak of such a war of aggression our responsibility for the insurance
automatically ends."
42. See "Primer," at 30; J.A. Cohen, Chinese Law and Sino-American Trade,
in: A. Eckstein (ed.), China Trade Prospects and U.S. Policy, New York 1971, at
151.
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analyzed in this paper. In spite of the strong efforts of German
negotiators, who were mainly concerned with possible stoppages
of their sub-suppliers as well as with possible problems regarding
supply of raw materials, the Chinese refused to allow such a broad
formulation of force majeure. In the Chinese standard contracts,
however, one finds more extensive force majeur clauses. 43 If this is
mentioned during negotiation sessions, the Chinese only point out
that there are other products involved. It is obvious that the
Chinese want to control the cases of application of force majeur.
This also results from the following Chinese proposal of a clause:
"or by other causes beyond the parties' control and agreed upon
by the parties." 44 It is to be emphasized, however, that the Chinese
apply force majeur clauses more liberally than do the Germans.
Thus a German firm that was not able to supply at due time
because of a strike of metal workers (in the middle of the 1960s)
was regarded as not responsible because of force majeur although
"strike" was not included in the relevant contract clause. It has
also occurred that defects of materials, if they are regarded as
unavoidable - this is the case concerning defects of castings, for
example - are dealt with as force majeur. It is important,
however, that the buyer be informed as soon as possible
concerning such circumstances. If those circumstances continue
longer than a certain number of months (three or six), "friendly
negotiations" have to take place in order to reach an agreement
about the continuation of the execution of the contract. Sometimes
the relevant clause provides that when it is impossible to reach an
agreement the matter has to be handled by arbitration. It is very
rare that the buyer gets the right to cancel the contract (for
instance: "In case the accident lasts for more than 12 weeks the
Buyers shall have the right to cancel the contract"). Being aware
of Chinese reluctance towards arbitration procedures, the German
merchant rather tries to succeed with a right of action instead of a
right of withdrawal. One then ensures that there will be further
negotiations and a chance to continue with the fulfilment of the
contract, or, should this not be possible, one is at least certain that
43. In the "Purchase Contract of the China National Chemicals Import and
Export Corporation" the "generally recognized 'Force Majeur' clauses" are dealt
with. Sometimes "Force Majeur" is only mentioned as such without being further
defined. It may be added that in one case it 'was difficult to explain to the Chinese
the distinction between Force Majeur and distribution of risk as it would become
relevant should the "f.o.b.-ship" sink because of a typhoon.
44. For the Chinese it seems to be essential not to recognize expressis verbis
strike and want of raw materials as "Force Majeur."
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a notice (or withdrawal) is only effective when expressed (e.g., by
an arbitration tribunal).
During arbitration procedures, the execution of the contract
must usually be continued. A termination of the whole project in
due time is of highest priority in planned economies. In one
contract, however, it is made clear that further execution is only to
be carried through "as the performance of the contract is not effected by the questions and problems submitted to arbitration."
Penalties are stipulated concerning default and performance
not in accordance with the contract. The penalty of default does
not exceed 5% of the value of the supply that is in default.
Sometimes, however, the whole contract price is taken as a basis.
Regarding performance not in accordance with the contract, the
seller has the duty to improve his performance. The quality of the
product is seen as an absolute guarantee; deviations are always
defined as non-performance. The same is true for, say, 95% of the
guaranteed capacity. For the other 5% the payment of a penalty is
stipulated (for instance, for each percentage of deviation, 0.5% of
the contract price). Another penalty is stipulated concerning
deviations of guaranteed consumptions (raw materials and
utilities). Here it is agreed upon that the amount by which
guaranteed expenses are higher in a specific year must be paid as
a penality.

e. Clauses Concerning Patents and Know-How
It is in accordance with the usag':l in foreign trade that, in the
case of the sale of technical methods for use in the sold plant, the
buyer must ascertain whether rights of third persons in his
country are interfered with by the transaction. Such a practice has
no material basis in China today. There is no patent law and no
patent office. 45 During the sixties an invention could bring some
financial advantages to the inventor, 46 but also in those days the
state received the ownership rights. Since the Cultural Revolution,
however, even such awards are regarded as expressions of
"bourgeois law." The elimination of such financial advantages
serves the "limitation of the bourgeois rights" (which cannot
completely be abolished during the socialist phase).

45. Statutes of 1950 and 1954 contained elements of patent law.
46. In Nov. 3, 1963 the State Council published "Regulations concerning
awards for inventions," see FGHB vol. 13, at 241.
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The foreign trading partner is thus confronted with the need
of a case-to-case regulation. 47 Therefore, the following expressions
of patent liability are often found in contracts: Oppositions made
within China are dealt with by the Chinese; claims from outside of
China (i.e., based upon rights which were applied for outside of
China) are handled by the German seller. The Chinese side
requests a list of all registered patents owned by the licensors.
As far as the problems of transfer of know-how are concerned,
the Chinese adjust themselves only slowly. The efforts of the
sellers to include relevant clauses in the contracts meet with the
opposition of the Chinese ("You don't know the Chinese people,
otherwise you would not insist on such or such a clause"). From
case to case in a different attitude, influenced by the particular
plant and the general bargaining power, the Chinese declare that
they are prepared to use the received technical informations only
for their own operation and not to reproduce the plant without the
consent of the seller. A typical clause reads, "The license, the
know-how, technical documentation and other information are to
be used only for the construction, operation and maintenance of
the contract plant." Such a clause is valid without temporal
limitation. A period of concealment of ten to twelve years (from
the date of the coming into force of the contract) only exists
concerning third persons; the scope of license is not effected
thereby. 48
Transfer of know-how to the buyer is carried through in
several ways: by the training of Chinese technicians in a factory
of the seller which is similar or identical to the contract plant; by
instructions given by the seller's assemblers to their Chinese
colleagues at the construction site; finally by the transfer of
documentation and other information "regarding know-how and
license applied in production, operation, and maintenance.... "
The licenses are conceded for a fixed capacity and are so
confined; each extension has to be the object of new license
negotiations. The Chinese are not prepared to agree to an
exchange of know-how. Thus they have objected to the proposal of
a licensor, on a basis of mutual advantage, to exchange
47. In contrast to the protection of trademarks, see R. Heuser, in RIW vol. 20
(1974), at 462. See also A. Smith, Chinese Trademarks in Hong Kong, in USCBR
vol. 1, no. 6 (Nov.·Dec. 1974), at 4.
48. The Chinese do not always understand this easily. Therefore it is to be
recommended to distinguish licensing and concealment-duty in different contract
clauses. In one contract it was additionally stressed that both concepts may not be
considered together!
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experiences regarding the improvement of the technical process
five years after completion of the contract plant. The Chinese
argue that they are not yet in a position for such cooperation.
Instead, there exists the following clause concerning a one-sided
duty to make subsequent experiences known:
Within five years after signing the present Contract whenever there is any improvement or innovation made by the
Seller on the license and know-how relating to the Contract
Plant, the Seller shall provide the Buyer with detailed
information free of charge and the Buyer is entitled to use
it.
The license fees may be contained in the contract price or set out
separately.

f.

Limitation of Liability

For every supplier it is of utmost importance to stipulate the
limitations of his liability in the contract. The Chinese are, of
course, familiar with the concepts of responsibility and liability,
i.e., with the general principle that responsibility is combined with
a generally unlimited liability of property. 49 On the other hand, it
seems quite difficult to convince the Chinese that this lapidary
principle of "who is responsible is also liable" has to be modified
in favor of a limitation of liability. 50 In accordance with their
understanding, the Chinese attempt to succeed in an unlimited
liability concerning defects in planning and instruction. The
German partners, however, succeeded mostly in stipulating a
certain maximum limit of liability. Regarding bodily injury
culpably caused, however, the foreign partner has to be liable
without any limitation. 51 Attempts to introduce a maximum limit
also in this sphere are objected to by the Chinese. "Friendly
negotiations" are considered to be the proper framework for the
49. See for instance: Basic Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, English
translation by U.S. Joint Publication Research Service, 4879 (Aug. 15, 1961), at
182, 325ff. (This is the most important source of Chinese civil law.)
50. The Chinese conceive the claim for damages based upon civil liability
primarily under the aspect of penalty; see ibid., at 326. With regard to such a
concept the disintegration of responsibility and liability must appear to be
immoral.
51. When this duty should become part of the contract. There is, however, on
the Chinese side a tendency to "repress" those questions during the negotiations.
Legally only what became part of the contract can be invoked; there is, therefore,
sometimes no liability at all.
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adjustment of damages. It is self-evident that a liability for
consequential damages is generally excluded. Although this is in
accordance with the international standard, the Chinese must
sometimes first be convinced about the necessity of this kind of
exemption from liability.
IV. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

It is in accordance with traditional Chinese thinking52 that
when arbitration clauses are contained in commercial agreements
and in individual contracts, and when disputes arise concerning
the execution of the contract, an attempt should first of all be
made to solve these disputes by "friendly negotiations" 53 as a
preferred means of settlement. Only after the failure of these
friendly negotiations as a means of settlement should the way be
opened for a method of settlement by participation of a third
institution, viz., the arbitration process. The Chinese "Primer"
points out, "Foreign Trade arbitration occurs when, in the course
of carrying out a contract, the two sides . . . have a dispute and
cannot reach an agreement even after negotiation." And further,
" ... our country's foreign trade arbitration system relies on a
spirit of cooperation between arbitration and mediation. We try
whenever possible to solve disputes through mediation, doing
everything we can to help the two sides to reach an agreement
through the principle of negotiation and voluntarism .... " 54 This
evaluation of judicial procedure with its binding decisions as an
ultimum remedium may, as V. Li points out, 55 result from the
Confucian as well as Marxist view about the (good) nature of men
- that reasonable persons are in a position to settle their disputes
among themselves. This is, however, quite consistent with the
general practice of foreign trade as such. Bilateral negotiations
and mediation always precede formal arbitration procedures.
Typical for the Chinese is the degree of informality in mediation
52. See, e.g., J. A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, in:
California Law Review vol. 54 (1966), at 1201.
53. A similar reference was contained, e.g., in the standard contract
concerning the order of cotton as used in the commerce between Chinese and
British merchants; see Chow Kwong-Shu, A Handbook of Chinese Trade Customs,
Shanghai 1933, at 25.
54. Op. cit., at 32 f. Similarly, the short statement of the director of the legal
department of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Mr. Jen
Tsien-hsin, in: China's Foreign Trade 1975, no. 3, at 50 f.
55. Conflict on Contracts and Why Things are What They are in China, in:
Worldwide P & I Planning, 1972.
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and the eventual success of "friendly negotiations." 56 It is indeed
noticeable that arbitration clauses, which are hereinafter described, are almost never invoked. 57

a. Stipulation of an Arbitration Clause
The experience with the practice of dispute settlement in FRGPRC tradess does not avoid lengthy negotiations about arbitration
questions. The Chinese no longer attempt to circumscribe the
jurisdiction of their own foreign trade arbitration 5 9 into a contract
concerning a complete equipment sale. The jurisdiction of the
56. A German-American merchant, referred to as "probably the most
experienced China trader alive," pointed out: "Forget about going to arbitration.
You will find the Chinese to be the fairest and most ingenious conciliators in the
world of commerce." See USCBR vol. 1, no. 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1974), at 3, 4.
57. This in contrast to the trade with the Soviet union. The foreign trade
arbitration committee in Moskow published several thousand of pages with
decisions; see H. Berman and G. Bustin, The Soviet System of Foreign Trade, in: R.
Starr (ed.), Business Transactions in the U.S.S.R., 1975, at 49, footnote 80.
Contrary to this, Chinese authorities have published up to now only one case
(which was pending at the Maritime Arbitration Tribunal in Peking). It is
characteristic that this case was mediated; see The Bureau of Salvage Work of
Shanghai v. Valdemar Skogland A/S of Norway in: Foreign Trade (Peking) 1963,
no. 3, at 4.
58. The often mentioned study of H. Fellhauer, Die Aussenhandelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Volksrepublik China (The Foreign Trade Arbitration of the
PRC), in: Recht im Aussenhandel, vol. 6 (1960), at 7 f. does not contain any
reference to the pending of a case of German company at the Peking foreign
trade arbitration. And also Cohen (op. cit., supra, note 52) remarks more generally
that he does not know of any case before the Peking arbitration tribunals "that
has been disposed of by arbitration rather than mediation" (p. 1204).
59. In execution of relevant decisions of the State Council (government) the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade established a foreign trade
arbitration commission in 1956 and a maritime arbitration commission in 1959.
The respective arbitration statutes contain concise rules of procedure regarding
initiating the action up to the eventual award. There is no need to rely on any
further legal sources, for example, a code of civil procedure. The procedural rules
are almost identical with those pf permanent arbitration courts in the West. They
grant both parties a claim to a due process of law, avoid any discrimination
against the foreign party and contain almost no limitation worth mentioning of
the giving of evidence. It is unusual, however, that the court sessions are public
("Primer," at 32: "Cases conducted within the arbitration system of capitalist
countries were usually not public") and that the chairman has the competence to
order the safeguarding of the claim involved if applied for by the party. With
regard to the U.S.S.R. the independence of the foreign trade arbitration court has
been and is still questioned. Doubts in this direction, however, are only justified
concerning the structure of the court as well as the whole foreign trade
organization in general. On account of its practice, however, the Soviet foreign
trade arbitration tribunal has acquired an excellent reputation.

a
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arbitration tribunal of the International Chamber of Commerce
(Paris), often sought by the German merchants, has up to now
always been opposed by the Chinese. An agreement is often
reached by declaring Stockholm, Sweden as the seat of the
arbitration tribunal. 60 A typical arbitration clause reads as
follows:
All disputes in connection with the contract shall be
settled by friendly consultation between both parties. In case
no agreement can be reached, the disputes shall be submitted
to arbitration.
The arbitration shall be conducted in Stockholm,
Sweden, according to Swedish Arbitration Procedures.
Sometimes it is added:
An arbitration committee, consisting of three persons, shall
be formed by one each from both the Buyer and the Seller as
well as one third nationality who is agreed upon by both
parties.
Sometimes the nationality of the third person is already stipulated
in the contract (usually Swedish).

b. Substantive Law to be Applied
With an agreement about the venue of the arbitration
committee, the question concerning the relevant substantive law
is not thereby answered eo ipso. The Chinese "Primer" points out
correctly that "fixing the place of arbitration is relatively
important because it can determine just what laws and regulations will govern the proceedings." 61 This is the case if the
contract does not stipulate a specific legal order as applicable, and
when the determination of the law to be applied is left to the rules
of private international law of the country in which arbitration
takes place. In only one of the contracts taken in account here was
a specific legal order stipulated to be applicable. There was no
agreement concerning the application both of Chinese and
German law, nor was it possible to declare "generally acknowl60. Seen from the Chinese point of view this regulation cannot be recommended either by conflict-of-law considerations or by the often mentioned fact that
Swedish civil and commercial law is particularly favorable to the buyer. According
to the present writer's opinion Swedish law would not be applicable.
61. Op. cit., at 32.
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edged usages" or "principles of commercial experiences" as a
basis for an arbitration decision. Thus the Swedish practice
concerning conflict of law gains importance. According to
Swedish practice, the starting point is no longer the lex loci
contractus 62 but the law of the country with which the contract is
most closely connected. 63 The criterion for this is the domicile of
the seller. This means that according to the Swedish conflict-oflaw practice German law has to be applied, 64 and hence the
unresolveable problem of ascertaining the contents of Chinese
civil and commercial law would not emerge.
One contract, for instance, had the following stipulation (as
suggested by the Chinese side): In the event that the German
partner appeals to the (Swedish) arbitration tribunal, Chinese law
applies; otherwise German law is to be applied.
The question concerning the contents of Chinese law also has
application in another field. In all the contracts whose execution
implies services of German fitters at the construction site it is
pointed out:
The Sellers technical personnel and their families shall
observe the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of
China and the rules and regulations of the plant-site during
their stay in China.
The problem of ascertaining those laws and regulations is usually
answered by the statement that there is nothing in written form
62. For a long time this was the general practice. See e.g. H. Batiffol, Droit
International Prive, 4th ed., Paris 1967, at 635: "La majorite des auteurs penchent
traditionellement en faveur du lien de conclusion .... " However, this practice is
no longer used; see A. Schnitzer, Handbuch des internationalen Privatrechts, 4th
ed. (1957), vol. 1, at 129. This also includes eastern European countries; see, e.g., J.
Jakubowski, The Settlement of Foreign Trade Disputes in Poland, in: International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 11 (1962), at 814. The most comprehensive
study of a PRC author regarding- international private law (Ni Zheng-ao, Problems
of Judicial Jurisdiction in Public International Law, Peking 1964) is also evidence
of this development but does not deal in particular with the Chinese practice (see
especially pp. 71 ff.).
63. H. Eck, The Swedish Conflicts of Laws, Stockholm 1965, at 266. See also H.
Nial, American-Swedish Private International Law, New York 1965, at 51 ff. Here
the focus is on the "center of gravity."
64. Such a complicated situation mentioned by Smith (supra note 26) will not
emerge in the German-Chinese trade. Smith: "... in the case of the Sale to the
PRC of Canadian wheat, f.o.b. Vancouver, the contract having been concluded in
Hong Kong between China Resources and the Canadian Wheat Board and with a
provision for arbitration in Switzerland."
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and that they can only be communicated by oral instructions. 65
The lack of compilations concerning the relevant legal sources
makes the following clause necessary:
The Buyer shall explain to the Seller's technical personnel
the laws, regulations and rules which are to be observed by
them after they arrive at the plant-site.
Oral instructions are given as a kind of educational contribution
to the "guests of the country." Proper behavior at the construction
site, in traffic and transportation and toward women are its main
objects. To one German supplier written rules concerning duty on
importation 66 and safety and "local rules" will be prescribed.6 7
The incompleteness of those regulations leads to the consequence
that the sphere of movement of the foreign personnel is very
limited; the development of legally relevant facts shall be
restricted as far as possible. 68
A German firm felt it necessary to have the following
stipulation written in the contract: "The Buyer agrees that the
Seller's personnel remain always in possession of their passports." This was done in view of experiences during the Cultural
Revolution. Cohen warned, "Although the worst excesses of the
Cultural Revolution seem to have ended, foreigners engaged in
trade with China cannot yet feel secure against arbitrary
interference with their personal freedom .... " 69
65. This may only apply to regulations concerning foreigners. The proposal of
the chief of a Chinese negotiation delegation to hand to him a German code in
order to write at the margin the rules deviating in China may be mentioned as a
curiosity.
66. Between the Chinese Foreign Trade Companies and the Board of Customs
exists an agreement concerning preferential tariffs of foreign technical personnel.
67. In the "Gongzuo Riji" (The Working Daily) which is kept at a construction
site it is pointed out: "The Seller's personnel has been given 'Regulations
governing the entry, exit, transit, residence and travel of aliens' by the Buyer.
Special law in China has not been explained."
68. In the service contracts questions of lodging, holidays and transportation
are dealt with in detail. G. Crespi Reghizzi's statement (op. cit., supra note 24)
concerning the need of a study about Chinese civil law "in order to know the rights
and the obligations of the Western trade representations, delegates and technical
personnel who are living in China, bargaining with the Chinese and assisting
them in setting up their new plants ..." is bound both to liberal ideas of western
consuming societies and to the legalistic concept of western social systems, (at 86,
footnote 1).
69. Cohen, op. cit. (supra note 42), at 146.

